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Abstract This study investigates the influence of managerial incentives on the resolution
of financial distress. Our model predicts that when creditors and equityholders prefer
different resolution methods, the likelihood of choosing Chapter 11 over private renegotiation is related to the ownership structure of the distressed firm. Empirical test results
using a sample of 81 voluntary Chapter 11 firms and 65 private workout firms support the
model’s prediction. We show that managerial ownership is positively related to the incidence of Chapter 11 filing when there is conflict between equityholders and creditors over
the choice between Chapter 11 and a private renegotiation. Consistent with prior literature,
we also find that the choice of resolution methods depends on the extent of creditor holdout
problems and the level of economic distress. We also performed the analysis of a subsequent 5 years of post-distress performance for all sample firms. The majorities of firms
that file for Chapter 11 lose their independence and are either acquired or liquidated.
However, more than half of firms in private workouts survived as independent firms.
Keywords
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1 Introduction
We investigate the impact of managerial incentives on the choice between Chapter 11 and
private renegotiation when a firm is under financial distress. Previous studies focus on
conflict between equityholders and creditors when they analyze the firm’s debt
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restructuring process (e.g., Brown 1989; Giammarino 1989; Mooradian 1994). They show
that firms resolve their financial distress in Chapter 11 despite incurring bankruptcy
costs when they have severe creditor holdout problems and asymmetric information
problems.
Consistent with these models, empirical studies show that the resolution method used by
financially distressed firms varies with the firms’ financial and economic characteristics.
For example, Gilson et al. (1990) show that financial distress is more likely to be resolved
through Chapter 11 when there are more distinct classes of debt outstanding in a distressed
firm and when bankruptcy costs are low. Charterjee et al. (1996) find that firms that file for
Chapter 11 are more economically distressed and have more bank debt.
Assuming that managers can influence the distressed firm’s debt restructuring decision,
we investigate whether the resolution of financial distress is influenced by managerial
incentives. By focusing on the situations where equityholders and creditors have different
preferences about the choice of resolution methods in a financially distressed firm, we
examine how conflict between management and equityholders arises in the choice between
Chapter 11 and private renegotiation.1 Since this study is focusing on the firm’s choice of a
resolution method, we consider only the firm’s voluntary Chapter 11 filing and private
renegotiation in the analysis.
We use a simple framework to show that the manager’s choice of resolution method is
not always consistent with the interest of equityholders but is sometimes aligned with the
interest of creditors. Under the situations where equityholders prefer to choose Chapter 11
but creditors’ preference is private renegotiation, the likelihood of Chapter 11 filing
increases with the increase of managerial shareholdings and outside blockholders’
ownership.
By using a sample of 81 voluntary Chapter 11 filing firms and 65 private workout firms
during the period of 1992 through 1998, we show that managerial ownership is positively
related to the probability of Chapter 11 filing even after controlling for the impact of
management displacements when there is conflict between equityholders and creditors over
the choice between Chapter 11 and a private workout. Consistent with prior literature (e.g.,
Charterjee et al. 1996), we also find that the choice of resolution methods depends on the
extent of creditor holdout problems and the level of economic distress.
We also perform the analysis of a subsequent 5 years of post-distress performance for
all sample firms.2 The majorities of firms that file for Chapter 11 lose their independence
and are either acquired or liquidated. However, more than half of firms in private workouts
survived as independent firms. Firms that file for Chapter 11 have relatively higher chance
of being acquired or liquidated than private workout firms. This result is consistent with
Kahl (2002).

1

Several previous studies, such as Bebcchuck and Chang (1992) and Berovitch and Israel (1998), analyze
the bankruptcy decision and debt contract renegotiation of distressed firms by focusing on the conflict of
interest between owner/manager and creditors. However those studies do not consider the conflicts of
interest between managers and equityholders in their theoretical frameworks by assuming that managers act
in the equityholders’ interests. Our study explicitly considers the situation where the conflict of interest
between managers and equityholders can arise in our analysis. We also conduct an empirical analysis.

2

The sample period of our study for the onset of reorganization is from 1992 to 1998. However, we also
analyze the subsequent five-year post-distress performance for all sample firms to examine the outcomes of
reorganization. In effect, our sample period covers the years of 1997–2003. Studies such as Kahl (2002) and
Turetsky and McEwen (2002) analyze post-performance of distressed firms.
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2 The influence of managerial incentives on the resolution of financial distress:
chapter 11 filing vs. private renegotiation
2.1 Framework
We present a simple framework to examine how managerial incentives affect the incidence
of Chapter 11 in the presence of conflict of interest between equityholders and creditors
over the choice of resolution method. We consider a firm that has no cash but has outstanding debt with a face value of D, currently payable in full.3 The firm’s equity securities
are owned by managers and outside equityholders. The firm is in financial distress and
must renegotiate with creditors by choosing the best way to resolve the financial distress.
Firms have two options available to them to resolve their financial distress: Chapter 11 and
private renegotiation.
Let V be the value of the financially distressed firm’s assets at the start of reorganization; it is the firm’s value before taking out deadweight costs in reorganization. A firm’s
reorganization describes the division of firm value between creditors and equityholders.
The claimholders’ preferences of a resolution method depend on the value they receive,
which is primarily determined by the relative costs and benefits of Chapter 11 versus
private renegotiation.
First, we assume that both a private workout and Chapter 11 incur financial distress
costs that are deadweight costs in the private workout (Cw [ 0) and bankruptcy costs
(CB [ 0), where W = private workout and B = bankruptcy.4 As suggested in prior evidence, we assume that bankruptcy costs are greater than deadweight costs in a private
workout (CB [ CW).5
The proportion of reorganization value that can be retained by equityholders in Chapter
11(in a private workout) equals d(B) (d(W)), where 0 \ d(B) \ 1 (0 \ d(W) \ 1).6 Given
that Chapter 11 filing is a frequently used method for resolving financial distress, and
assuming that bankruptcy costs are greater than deadweight costs in a private workout
(CB [ CW), firms file for Chapter 11 because Chapter 11 provides unique benefits to filing
firms, which private workout firms cannot obtain. These benefits include an automatic stay
from creditors and a less restrictive approval process for the reorganization.7
To incorporate this possibility, we assume that equityholders have a higher bargaining
ability to retain a certain proportion of the firm’s reorganization value in Chapter 11 than in
a private workout owing to the features of Chapter 11, thus [d(B)/d(W)] [ 1. Since this
3

In our framework, D is assumed to be the maximum value creditors can take in reorganization.

4

Deadweight costs in a private workout are transactions costs incurring in reorganization due to creditor
holdout problems in a distressed firm. Gilson (1997) broadly defined the transaction costs as a major
impediment to voluntary corporate restructuring. Bankruptcy costs are incurred in Chapter 11 because
Chapter 11 bankruptcy involves significant administrative costs and other economic losses (Gilson et al.
1990).

5

See Gilson et al. (1990), Gilson (1991), and Wruck (1990) for details.

6

We assume that there exists minimum equity value that can be preserved as long as a distressed firm is in
reorganization by negotiating with creditors (i.e., both d(B) and d(W) are positive).

7

Several studies identify the major sources of the equityholders’ ability to obtain value and parameters that
determine how much they will obtain under Chapter 11, even though the firm is insolvent (e.g., Franks and
Torous 1989; Bebchuk and Chang 1992; Mooradian 1994). The sources are option to delay and incentive to
take risky projects, which may incur significant financial distress costs to creditors. By avoiding these
options, equityholders can obtain part of these savings at the expense of creditors. Betker (1995) also
mentions that equityholders can directly affect a firm’s reorganization procedure in a Chapter 11 case by
forming an equity committee.
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assumption captures only equityholders’ bargaining ability inherited in the Chapter 11
reorganization, the actual dollar amount of equity value retained in private renegotiation
can be greater than that in Chapter 11. Thus, the choice of Chapter 11 as a firm’s
restructuring methods depends on the relative cost disadvantage of bankruptcy and the
relative benefit advantage of bankruptcy.
Managers may choose either Chapter 11 or a private workout to maximize their
expected payoff sometimes at the expense of equityholders. As discussed further below,
agency problem between the manager and equityholders can arise in a situation where
conflict of interest between equityholders and creditors exists.

3 Conflict of interest between equity and debt in the choice between Chapter 11
and private renegotiation
Based on the framework in the previous section, we identify the situations where equityholders and creditors have different preferences between Chapter 11 and a private
workout. Creditors and equityholders are expected to have the following payoffs in
Chapter 11 (B) or in a private workout (W).
VD (W) = min[D, (1  d(W))(V  CW )], and VD (B) = min[D, (1  d(B))(V  CB )],
VE (W) = (V  CW )  VD (W), and VE (B) = (V  CB )  VD (B),

ð1Þ

where VD (W) = creditors’ payoff in a private workout; VD(B) = creditors’ payoff in
Chapter 11; VE(W) = equityholders’ payoff in a private workout; VE(B) = equityholders’
payoff in Chapter 11.
Figure 1a and b illustrate payoffs to creditors and equityholders under a private workout
and Chapter 11, respectively. If V \ V1 or V [ V3, both creditors and equityholders prefer
a private workout to Chapter 11. However, if V1 B V B V3, equityholders prefer Chapter
11 while creditors prefer private renegotiation. Conflict of interest exists between equityholders and creditors on the choice between Chapter 11 and a private workout in this
range of V.8
We can measure the degree of conflict between equityholders and creditors to the choice
between Chapter 11 and private renegotiation by using the difference in the equityholders’
payoffs between Chapter 11 and a private workout. As shown in Fig. 1b, the conflict
increases as V increases above V1 until V reaches V2 and then the conflict declines to the
point where V is close to V3.
This suggests that conflict is more likely to exist when V is closer to V2 since equityholders can retain higher values in Chapter 11 than in a private workout while creditors’
preference is private renegotiation. As described in the Appendix, V2 denotes the firm’s
value at reorganization in which creditors can be paid in full in a private workout
(i.e., V = D/(1 - d(W)) + CW). This also suggests that conflict of interest between
equityholders and creditors is less likely to exist when V is small or large relative to
D/(1 - d(W)) + CW. In summary, equityholders prefer Chapter 11 to private renegotiation, but creditors’ preference is to renegotiate privately since in a Chapter 11 case,

8

A more complete algebraic analysis that derives parameter values that give rise to a conflict is provided in
the Appendix.
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(a)
Creditors’ Payoff

D
Payoff in a private
workout
=(1-δ (W))(V-CW)

Payoff in Chapter 11
=(1-δ(B))(V-CB)

CW

CB V1

V2 V3

V4

Firm Value at Reorganization (V)

(b)
Equityholders’ Payoff

Payoff in a private
workout
=(V-CW)-D
Payoff in
Chapter 11
=(V-CB)-D

Payoff in a private
workout
=δ(W)(V-CW)

Payoff in Chapter 11
=δ(B)(V-CB)

CW

CB V1

V2 V3

V4

Firm Value at Reorganization (V)

equityholders can retain a relatively higher value against creditors when the firm’s reorganization value (V) is close to D/(1 - d(W)) + CW.9

4 The existence of managerial incentives and the choice of a resolution method
We now introduce managerial incentives into the framework. We assume that in a
financially distressed firm, the management payoff is related to both equityholders’ payoffs
and creditors’ payoffs. As John and John (1993) suggest, in a period of financial distress,
the manager gets a potential payoff that consists of cash compensation (i.e., fixed salary
plus cash bonus), a proportion of equityholders’ payoff, and a penalty that can be interpreted as salary reduction or the costs of managerial turnover. As Betker (1995) argues,
creditors can control managers by affecting their cash compensation or by pressuring the
board of directors to replace them when the firm is in financial distress.
9

This explanation is consistent with the findings in Franks and Torous (1994). They find larger equity
deviations from absolute priority at reorganization when the face value of creditors’ claim (D) is close to the
value of the firm at reorganization. This finding suggests that the institutional characteristics of Chapter 11
are used as bargaining power by equityholders, which leads creditors to offer equityholders more when the
option to delay in Chapter 11 is close to or at-the-money (i.e., the firm’s reorganization value is close to D).
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There are several studies which show that creditors can influence the decision of distressed firms’ management. For example, Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) show that
managers’ compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors’ claims.10
Gilson (1989) shows that a significant number of management changes are initiated by
creditors when firms are in financial distress.11 More recently, Branch (2000) and
Campbell and Frost (2007) argue that when a firm is in financial distress, managers have a
fiduciary duty to protect the rights of creditors as well as duties to shareholders. Therefore,
in a financially distressed firm, we assume that the payoff for the manager depends on both
the value of equity and debt.
When there is a conflict of interest between equityholders and creditors over the choice
between Chapter 11 and private renegotiation (i.e., under the situation where the firm value
at reorganization is close to D/(1 - d(W)) + CW), the choice of Chapter 11 by the manager will depend on the degree to which the manager’s interests or preferences are tied to
those of equityholders relative to those of creditors, which can be denoted as c. Various
attributes of a distressed firm’s ownership structure can influence c. In this study, we
concentrate on the managerial shareholdings and the role of outside shareholders who hold
a large percentage of the firm’s equity (i.e., blockholders). Agency theory predicts that
managers might not always act in the best interest of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling
1976). If agency conflicts exist in financially distressed firms, then it is possible that
managers will make restructuring decisions inconsistent with the interests of shareholders.
Corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms exist to mitigate these agency conflicts.
Shareholdings by managers and directors are used to align their interests with those of
shareholders as well as unaffiliated equity blockholders with at least 5% ownership of the
firm (see Shleifer and Vishny 1986).
First, as the manager’s ownership stake increases, c will increase and the manager will
reap a greater fraction of the benefits associated with equity-value-enhancing actions. The
manager is, therefore, more likely to choose Chapter 11. Second, c will also increase as the
blockholders’ shareholdings increase. The outside blockholders will have incentives to
force the manager to choose Chapter 11 to increase their equity values.
In summary, the framework presented implies that the choice of resolution method in a
financially distressed firm can be influenced by ownership structure of a distressed firm
when there is a conflict of interest between equityholders and creditors. Based on the
discussion above, we propose two hypotheses:
H1: A financially distressed firm is more likely to use Chapter 11 rather than a private
workout as managerial shareholdings increase when the financially distressed firm’s value
at reorganization is close to the critical value where creditors are paid in full in a private
workout (i.e., V = D/(1 - d(W)) + CW), all else being equal.
H2: A financially distressed firm is more likely to use Chapter 11 rather than a private
workout with the increase of outside blockholders’ shareholdings when the financially
firm’s value at reorganization is close to the critical value where creditors are paid in full in
a private workout (i.e., V = D/(1 - d(W)) + CW), all else being equal.

10
Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) show that 10% of their sample explicitly tied the management compensation to creditors’ value. Managers are either awarded financial claims similar to those held by
creditors, or paid a bonus based on how much cash creditors received under the firm’s reorganization plan.
11
Gilson (1989) shows that 20 management changes out of 176 management changes for financially
distressed firms are initiated by bank lenders.
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5 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
5.1 Sample selection
Our final sample consists of 146 firms which are financially distressed during the 1992 and
1998 period and which resolve their financial distress either through Chapter 11 or private
renegotiation. Eighty-one firms file for Chapter 11 voluntarily and 65 firms renegotiate
privately with creditors. The onset of financial distress is the first time that a firm defaults
or violates a debt covenant; the firm resolves its financial distress by negotiating with its
creditors privately to restructure its debt, or by filing for Chapter 11 voluntarily. Our
sample selection process is as follows.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

The initial sample is created using a key word search of the Wall Street Journal Index
(WSJI) and Lexis–Nexis. The key words used in the search are ‘‘debt restructuring’’,
‘‘loan restructuring’’, and ‘‘financial restructuring’’. Since this study focuses on debt
restructurings that occur in financial distress, the search is restricted to articles that
also contain the key words ‘‘default’’, ‘‘troubled’’, ‘‘distressed’’, or bankruptcy’’
(Brown et al. 1994; James 1995).12 Over the period of 1992–1998, this results in 849
potential observations.
We search Lexis–Nexis to identify whether distressed firms restructure their debts
through Chapter 11 filing or by renegotiating with creditors privately. For the Chapter
11 cases, it is easy to identify the filing date through the WSJI and Lexis-Nexis. Most of
the private debt restructurings, however, do not have well-defined beginning dates or
ending dates. To identify private debt restructuring firms, the definition of Gilson et al.
(1990) is used. They define a debt restructuring as a transaction in which the firm’s
debt contracts are amended on one of the following terms: (i) promised interest or
principal payments on the debt are reduced; (ii) the debt’s maturity is extended; or (iii)
creditors are given equity securities of the firm. Debt restructuring is assumed to take
place over the interval defined by the first and last reference to the restructuring in
Lexis–Nexis and the Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI), unless more accurate dates are
available from other sources.13 Within the sample of distressed firms that satisfy these
criteria, there are 214 Chapter 11 firms and 72 private workout firms (Total 286 firms).
Since the analysis focuses on the choice between Chapter 11 filing and private
renegotiation with creditors, the sample is restricted to the first-time filing of Chapter
11 and private renegotiation. Chapter 11 filing firms are limited to the firms that do
not have a private workout during the 2 years prior to filing. This results in 149
Chapter 11 firms and 72 private workout firms (Total 221 firms).
We also perform an analysis of a subsequent 5 years of post-distress performance for
Chapter 11 firms and private workout firms to investigate how the choice of
restructuring method is related to the outcomes of restructuring. Thus, our analysis
extends to the period of 1997–2003. For each firm, the outcome of restructuring is
identified by searching through the WSJI and Lexis–Nexis at least for 5 years after the
onset of a firm’s financial distress. One possible resolution of financial distress is that
the firm survives the entire process of financial distress and emerges as independent

12
Some firms adopt debt restructuring for the strategic purpose although they are not in the financial
distress. These firms are excluded from the sample.
13
This procedure for gathering the sample is common for the related studies (e.g., Gilson et al. 1990;
Charterjee et al. 1996). However, other studies, such as Sun (2007), use different method to collect the
sample for distressed firms.
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entity. To include the firms which remain independent after reorganization, we look
for any sign in the articles in Lexis/Nexis that indicates the firm is clearly out of
financial distress (for example, resuming dividend payment on its common stocks or
raising substantial funds in the debt or equity market).14 The other possibility is
acquisition or liquidation. Both indicate the end of the firm as an independent entity
and the reallocation of its assets to a different user. We include only the acquisitions
and liquidations which are related to the incidence of financial distress. This results in
103 Chapter 11 firms and 68 private workout firms (Total 171 firms).
Mostly, we collect distressed firms’ financial data that closely pre-date the
announcement of restructuring methods except some managerial ownership data.
Managerial ownership data have to be related to the management who actually made
a decision for choosing the resolution method. Thus, for firms with management
displacement prior to the onset of debt restructuring, we collect managerial ownership
data which closely post-date the announcement of top management displacements.
Originally 60 firms with top management displacements prior to the onset of debt
restructuring are identified. However, owing to incomplete financial information for
some firms, only 35 firms (18 Chapter 11 firms and 17 private workout firms) with top
management displacements are included in the empirical analysis.

For a firm to be included in the sample, descriptive financial characteristics, information
on the complexity of debt, ownership structure, and other financial data must be available
in COMPUSTAT database, Compact Disclosure, 10 K reports, Proxy Statements and
Moody’s manuals. Consequently, we have a final sample which consists of 81 Chapter 11
firms and 65 private workout firms (Total 146 firms). Our sample is quite comparable to the
sample of similar studies, such as Kahl (2002).15 Sample selection process is summarized
in described in Table 1.

5.2 Descriptive statistics
The sample is comprised of 81 firms that restructure under Chapter 11 filing and 65 firms
reorganize in a private workout. Table 2 provides an industry distribution of the sample
firms. Our sample is distributed across a broad category of industries, with a concentration
in manufacturing, and trade retail & wholesale industries. The industry concentration in
our sample is comparable to research samples of financially distressed firms in previous
studies (e.g., Charterjee et al. 1996).
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics concerning the financial characteristics of the
firms at the onset of financial distress and the outcomes of reorganization. The results from
differences in means test and Wilcoxon sum rank test are also provided in Table 3.
14
A necessary condition for firms that remain independent is that the firm is not in Chapter 11, is not in
default, and not negotiating to restructure its debt to avoid a default, at least for 5 years after the onset of
financial distress.
15

We compare the sample of our paper with Kahl (2002) and find that the samples in Kahl (2002) and our
paper are quite comparable. Kahl (2002) uses a sample of 102 firms which consist of Chapter 11s (56 firms,
54.9%) and private renegotiation firms (46 firms, 45.1%) during a period of 1979–1983. The paper analyzed
the debt restructuring process from the onset of restructuring to the outcomes of restructuring. The overall
average rate of sample (the number of the sample observations divided by the number of sample years) in
Kahl (2002) is 20.2 (105/5) (Chapter 11s: 11.2, and private workouts: 9.2). The overall average of our
sample is 20.9 (146/7) (Chapter 11s (55.4% of the sample): 11.6 and private workouts (44.5% of the
sample): 9.3).
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Table 1 Sample selection process
Steps

Selection process

Number of firms

Step 1

Financially distressed firms with debt restructurings are
identified by using keyword search of Wall Street
Journal Index and Lexis–Nexis (Keywords: debt
restructuring, loan restructuring, financial
restructuring, default, troubled, distressed, and
bankruptcy)

Total 849 observations

Step 2

Identify whether distressed firms restructure their debts
through Chapter 11 filing or a private workout

Total 286 firms

Restriction to the first time filing of Chapter 11 and a
private workout. Also, Chapter 11 firms do not have a
private workout before the filing

Total 221 firms

Identify firms which have the information of five year
post-distress performance: outcomes of restructuring

Total 171 firms

Identify firms with management displacement before
the onset of restructuring and restrict firms with the
information about ownership structure, debt structure,
and other financial characteristics

Total 146 firms (Final sample)

Chapter 11 firms: 214
Private workout firms: 72

Step 3

Step 4

Chapter 11 firms: 149
Private workout firms: 72
Chapter 11 firms: 103
Private workout firms: 68

Step 5

Chapter 11 firms: 81
Private workout firms: 65

Note: Major data sources in the sample selection process are Wall Street Journal Index, Lexis–Nexis,
Compustat, Compact Disclosure, 10K reports, Proxy statements and Moody’s Manual

Table 2 Industry classification
Industry classification

All sample
(N = 146)

Chapter 11
(N = 81)

Private workouts
(N = 65)

Mining and construction

18

7

11

Manufacturing

49

25

24

Transportation and communication

8

6

2

Utilities

8

3

5

45

34

11

Trade retail & wholesale
Financial institutions and real estate
Services

2

1

1

16

5

11

Note: This table presents descriptive characteristics of the restructuring firms during the period of 1992–
1998. The sample is comprised of firms which attempt the first time to restructure via a Chapter 11 filings
(81 firms) or private workouts (65 firms). A private workout involves private negotiations between a firm
and creditors. Major data sources are Compustat, Compact Disclosure, and Moody’s Manual

Managers and CEO in Chapter 11 firms hold relatively higher ownership stakes than
those in private workout firms. This result is consistent with the prediction that managerial
incentives influence a firm’s choice between Chapter 11 and private workout. However, it
is also possible that significantly higher managerial ownership of Chapter 11 firms is due to
the relatively small size of Chapter 11 firms since in general small firms have higher
managerial ownership than large firms.
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Table 3 Characteristics of firms and outcomes of reorganization: Chapter 11 firms vs. private workouts
Variables

Chapter 11 firms

Private workout firms

Mean

Mean

Median

Median

Managerial ownership (MGT)

0.246*

0.237**

0.189

0.132

CEO ownership (CEO)

0.085*

0.019

0.048

0.019

Management change before the onset of restructuring

0.220

0.000

0.265

0.000

Outside blockholders’ ownership (BLOCK)

0.198

0.136

0.189

0.162

Bank debt/total liabilities (BANK)

0.113*

0.010**

0.062

0.000

Number of long-term debt contracts (#LTD)

2.728

2.000

3.094

3.000

Existence of public debt (PUBLIC_DEBT)

0.370

0.000

0.468

0.000

-0.046

-0.093

-0.027

EBITDA/total assets (EBITDA_RATIO)

-0.216*

Industry-adjusted EBITDA_RATIO)

-0.319**

-0.165

-0.178

-0.116

Total assets (millions$) (TA)

280.07*

145.97

421.46

277.09

Market to book value ratio (MB)

1.584

1.184

1.419

Solvency ratio (SOLV)

0.546*

0.544*

0.629

0.697

Continue as an independent company

0.272***

0.000***

0.547

1.000

Acquired

0.358

0.000

0.296

0.000

Liquidated

0.370***

0.000***

0.156

0.000

Observations

81

1.151

65

Note: This table presents descriptive characteristics of the restructuring firms during the period of 1992–
1998. The sample is comprised of firms which attempt the first time to restructure via a Chapter 11 filings
(81 firms) or private workouts (65 firms). A private workout involves private negotiations between a firm
and creditors. Major data sources are Lexis and Nexis, Compustat, Compact Disclosure, Proxy statements,
and Moody’s Manual
***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels from the mean and median of
the private workout firms. The median test is based on Wilcoxon sum rank test statistics

We measure the degree of the creditors’ coordination problem by the proportion of bank
debt to total assets, the number of long-term debt contracts, and the existence of public
debt. In Table 3, Chapter 11 firms have significantly greater proportion of bank debt than
private workout firms. This result suggests that higher proportions of bank debt are
obstacles for firms to choose a private workout (see Asquith et al. 1994; Charterjee et al.
1996).
Consistent with the findings in Charterjee et al. (1996), Chapter 11 firms have significantly lower EBITDA to total asset ratios and lower industry-adjusted EBITDA to total
asset ratios than private workout firms.16 Since the EBITDA to total asset ratio proxies the
relative degree of economic distress faced by Chapter 11 and private workout firms, this
finding suggests that firms restructuring informally have better economic prospects than
those reorganizing in Chapter 11.
The mean and the median of firms’ book value of total assets are significantly lower for
Chapter 11 firms. Small firms tend to be first-time filers of Chapter 11 on average, suggesting that larger firms may have a comparative advantage in reorganizing their debt
claims privately (e.g., Gilson et al 1990; Charterjee et al. 1996).

16
Industry-adjusted EBITDA to total assets ratio is constructed by subtracting the median EBITDA/total
assets of all other Compustat firms with the same 3-digit SIC code from a firm’s EBITDA/total assets.
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Table 4 Ownership structure and financially distressed firms with different levels of solvency ratio
Full sub-sample

Chapter 11 firms

Private
workouts

t/z Statistics
for difference

Panel A: Distressed firms with low solvency ratio (LSOLV)
Managerial ownership
Mean (%)

23.70

27.68

17.43

2.13**

Median (%)

19.75

24.55

6.80

-2.55***

Blockholders’ ownership
Mean (%)

18.13

18.23

17.97

0.96

Median (%)

11.21

11.00

12.30

-0.39

Observations

72 (100%)

44 (61.11%)

28 (38.89%)

Panel B: Distressed firms with high solvency ratio (HSOLV)
Managerial ownership
Mean (%)

20.47

20.92

20.00

0.83

Median (%)

15.80

15.70

16.05

0.04

Blockholders’ ownership
Mean (%)

20.66

21.61

19.69

0.67

Median (%)

18.90

18.53

19.86

-0.14

Observations

73 (100%)

37 (50.68%)

36 (49.32%)

Note: This table presents descriptive characteristics of the restructuring firms during the period of 1992–
1998. The sample is comprised of firms which attempt the first time to restructure via a Chapter 11 filings
(81 firms) or private workouts (65 firms). A private workout involves private negotiations between a firm
and creditors. Major data sources are Lexis and Nexis, Compustat, Compact Disclosure, Proxy statements,
and Moody’s Manual
***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. The median test is based on
Wilcoxon sum rank test statistics

Chapter 11 firms have a slightly lower solvency ratio (i.e., less insolvent at reorganization) than private workout firms. The lower solvency ratio of Chapter 11 firms is
consistent with the analysis in our framework. The framework in the previous section
suggests that firms with solvency ratio in a relatively low range are more likely to choose
Chapter 11 because the benefits from Chapter 11 can offset the high deadweight costs in
Chapter 11. The higher solvency ratio (i.e., more insolvent) for private workout firms
suggests that relatively more insolvent firms are likely to choose private workouts because
Chapter 11 costs will dominate the benefits from Chapter 11.
Table 3 also summarizes how a firm’s financial distress is resolved. By analyzing the
subsequent five-year after the onset of reorganization during the period of 1998–2003, we
find that the majorities of firms that file for Chapter 11 lose their independence and are
either acquired or liquidated. Twenty-seven firms are acquired and 31 firms are liquidated.
Twenty-three firms (28.4%) emerge from Chapter 11 as independent companies. More than
half of firms in private workouts survived as independent firms (35 firms, 53.9%). Nineteen
firms are acquired and only 10 firms are liquidated in the sample of private workouts. The
results of Table 3 show that firms that file for Chapter 11 have relatively higher chance of
liquidation than private workout firms. It is probably due to the less economic viability of
Chapter 11 firms than private workout firms.
Finally, Table 4 shows that the proportion of Chapter 11 firms with low solvency ratio
(61.11%) is greater than that of Chapter 11 firms with high solvency ratio (38.89%), suggesting that relatively less financially distressed firms are more likely to file for Chapter 11.
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Furthermore, Panel A in Table 4 shows that for distressed firms with a low solvency ratio,
managerial ownership in Chapter 11 firms is significantly greater than that in private workout
firms. The mean and median differences of managerial ownership between Chapter 11 firms
and private workout firms are significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. However,
mean and median differences of blockholders’ ownership are not statistically significant.
For distressed firms with high solvency ratio, neither managerial nor blockholders’
ownership is statistically different between Chapter 11 firms and private workout firms.
This result supports the prediction that Chapter 11 filing under the presence of conflict
between equityholders and creditors is related to managerial incentives.

6 The influence of ownership structure on the restructuring decisions:
Chapter 11 vs. private renegotiation
6.1 Logistic regression analysis
As discussed in the previous sections, conflict between creditors and equityholders occurs
when the firm’s reorganization value (V) is close to D/(1 - d(W)) + CW. Since parameter
values for the proportion of reorganization value that can be retained by creditors (i.e., 1 d(W)) and the deadweight costs in a private workout (i.e., CW) are unobservable at reorganization, we use the solvency ratio (SOLV) as a proxy for the degree of conflict between
creditors and equityholders by following the analysis in Bebchuck and Chang (1992).
SOLV equals the ratio of face value of all debt (D) to the value of the firm at the time of
reorganization (V).17 The higher the solvency ratio (SOLV), the more likely the firm’s
financial position is impaired. In our analysis, since V is based on the value of the distressed firm before taking out the deadweight costs in reorganization, V can be measured
by the sum of the face value of all debt plus the market value of equity at the start of the
firm’s reorganization. The data used to construct SOLV come from the COMPUSTAT or
Compact Disclosure data base and the data closely predate the firm’s onset of its reorganization decision.
According to the analysis in the previous section (see Fig. 1b), in a range of relatively
low solvency ratio (i.e., in a range of relatively high firm value (V) or when a firm’s
financial position is less impaired) conflict of interest between equityholders and creditors
is more likely to exist as V decreases or as the firm’s solvency ratio increases. It suggests
that the probability of Chapter 11 increases with the increase of solvency ratio when there
is conflict between equityholders and creditors.
However, in a range of relatively high solvency ratio (i.e., in a range of relatively low
firm value or when a firm’s financial position is more impaired) conflict is less likely to
exist as V decreases or as a firm’s solvency ratio increases, suggesting that the probability
of Chapter 11 becomes lower with the increase of solvency ratio when there is no conflict
between equityholders and creditors.
The analysis in Fig. 1b also suggests that when a firm’s solvency ratio is really low (such as
when V is greater than V4 in Fig. 1b), there is no conflict of interest between equityholders
and creditors since all claimholders prefer a private workout to Chapter 11. However, we
exclude this possibility in the empirical analysis since all firms in our sample are financially
distressed. Thus, the financially distressed firms in our sample are less likely to be in a range of
17
V is the value that the firm would have such that if the firm is not expected to incur the deadweight costs
in reorganization.
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V which is greater than V4. If this conjecture is correct, in our sample, conflict of interest
between equityholders and creditors is more likely to exist when the firm’s solvency ratio is
relatively low (i.e., when the firm’s financial position is relatively less impaired).
Therefore, we expect that the ownership structure of a firm and creditors’ holdout
problems are more likely to be related to the incidence of Chapter 11 filing for firms with
low solvency ratio. For firms with high solvency ratio, the economic distress is more likely
to be related to the incidence of Chapter 11 owing to the lower creditors’ holdout problems.
By using a solvency ratio as a measure of conflict between equityholders and creditors,
we estimate a logistic regression model to examine the impact of managerial incentives on
the restructuring decision: Chapter 11 vs. private renegotiation. The dependent variable
indicates whether the firm files for Chapter 11 voluntarily or renegotiates privately with
creditors. Explanatory variables are the ownership structure of a firm, the proxies for
creditors’ holdout problems and the levels of economic distress.
In our sample managerial ownership is generally measured by the percentage of shares
owned by the firm’s officers and directors (MGT) before the announcement of debt
restructuring method. There are two potential problems in our study regarding the impact
of managerial ownership. Firstly there may be incentives for managers to dump stocks
during the period of distress. However, Loderer and Sheehan (1989) and Ma (2001) find no
evidence that managers systematically reduce their stockholdings prior to bankruptcy in
spite of the substantial wealth decline incurred.
Secondly, as mentioned in previous studies (e.g., Gilson 1989), management turnover is
very common in the process of debt restructuring for financially distressed firms. In order
to perform an accurate analysis for the influence of managerial incentives on the choice
between Chapter 11 and a private workout, the managerial ownership has to be related to
the management who actually made the decision over the choice between Chapter 11 and
private workout. If managers are replaced prior to the onset of debt restructuring, the
ownership of the new management has to be included in the analysis. We collect managerial ownership data for firms with management displacement that closely postdate the
announcement of top management displacements. Also, to control for the impact of
management displacement in the regression analysis, we include a dummy variable for top
management changes prior to the announcement of debt restructuring (MGT_CH).18
Outside blockholders’ ownership is used to proxy for equityholders’ incentive to control
the management (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Outside blockholders’ ownership is measured
by the percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at least a 5% stake in the firm,
which is not related to the management (BLOCK). Ownership structure information for our
sample firms is collected by reading Proxy Statements of our sample firms.
Bankruptcy costs, creditors’ holdout problems, and the level of economic distress of a
firm are primary determinants of the choice between Chapter 11 and private renegotiation
(e.g., Gilson et al. 1990; Charterjee et al. 1996). First, researchers have used indirect ways
of measuring the bankruptcy costs. Gilson et al. (1990) argue that the destruction of goingconcern value occurs when a distressed firm’s assets are sold to resolve financial distress.
Assuming that assets are more likely to be sold in Chapter 11 than in a private workout,19
the firm with more intangible or specific assets will experience greater loss of value owing
to the asset sales, suggesting higher deadweight costs in Chapter 11. The potential loss of
18

This analysis is based on the reviewer’s suggestions.

19

Gilson et al. (1990) explain why assets are more likely to be sold in Chapter 11 than in private negotiations. For instance, the firm has more power over the disposition of the firm’s assets owing to automatic
stay provision.
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going-concern value is measured by the ratio of the firm’s market to the book value of
assets (MB).20
Second, even if stockholders and creditors believe that their combined wealth will be
higher if debt is restructured outside of Chapter 11, negotiations can break down if particular creditors hold out for more generous terms. Since this holdout problem can be
mitigated through Chapter 11 procedures, the probability of Chapter 11 will increase as
creditors’ holdout problems increase (e.g., Brown 1989).
The extent of creditors’ coordination problem is proxied by the characteristics of a firm’s
debt structure (Asquith et al. 1994; Charterjee et al. 1996; Gilson et al. 1990; Gilson 1997).
Each creditor’s incentive to hold out will be stronger when he or she holds a smaller claim,
because the distressed firm’s future financial health is less likely to be dependent upon
whether he or she grants the firm’s concessions (Gilson et al. 1990). Thus, as a proxy for the
complexity of a firm’s debt structure, we use the number of long-term debt contracts (#LTD)
and the existence of public debt contracts outstanding (PUBLIC_DEBT). Existing studies
(e.g., Asquith et al. 1994; Charterjee et al. 1996; James 1995) find that firms with a large
portion of bank debt tend to file for Chapter 11. Banks are less willing to make concessions in a
private workout because they typically hold senior and collateralized debt (BANK_DEBT).
Third, as presented in Mooradian (1994), an equilibrium exists in which economically
inefficient firms file for Chapter 11.21 Also as evidenced by Charterjee et al. (1996), firms
are more likely to file for Chapter 11 as they are less viable economically. To proxy for the
economic efficiency of distressed firms, we use industry-adjusted earnings before interest,
depreciation and taxes as a proportion of total assets, i.e., Industry Adjusted EBITDA/Total
Assets (Industry Adjusted EBITDA_RATIO). The incidence of Chapter 11 is negatively
related to EBITDA_RATIO, especially for firms with high solvency ratio (i.e., financially
more impaired firms).
Finally, we control for firm size. As a proxy for firm size, we use the log value of total
assets (lTA). Larger firms are in general more likely to choose a private workout because
they have a comparative advantage to settle with creditors privately and they incur higher
deadweight costs in Chapter 11 (Gilson et al. 1990; Wruck 1990). We perform logistic
regressions modeling the probability that a distressed firm file for Chapter 11 pending on
the situation whether there exists conflict of interest between equityholders and creditors.
Prob (Chapter 11 filing ¼ 1) ¼ F[b0 þ b1 (MGT)i þ b2 (MGT CH)i þ b3 (BLOCK)i
þ b4 (BANK)i þ b5 (#LTD)i þ b6 (PUBLIC DEBT)i
þ b7 (EBITDA RATIO)i þ b8 (MB)i þ b9 (lTA)i þ ei ],
ð2Þ
where
0

0

F(b0 X) ¼ eb X /(1 + eb X ).

20
The market to value of assets ratio is constructed using data from COMPUSTAT or Compact Disclosure
data base and is calculated as (book value of assets–book value of equity + market value of equity)/book
value of assets. When applicable, these figures are those that most closely predate the beginning of firms’
debt restructuring or bankruptcy.
21
In his model, Mooradian (1994) shows that the institutional characteristics of Chapter 11 filing provide an
incentive for economically inefficient firms to reorganize under Chapter 11 rather than mimic out-of-court
reorganization. Chapter 11 can be a screening device which separates inefficient firms from efficient firms,
enabling efficient firms to renegotiate and continue where they would otherwise be liquidated.
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6.2 Empirical findings22
In the logistic regressions, we subdivide the sample into two groups according to the level of
solvency ratio of distressed firms. We use the median level of solvency ratio of the sample to
subdivide the sample because the exact levels of solvency ratio which are related to the
existence of conflict of interest between equityholders and creditors are not observable.
Based on the analysis in Fig. 1b, equityholders in a firm with the solvency ratio less than
the median level (i.e., relatively high levels of V) can have an ability to obtain higher value,
net of deadweight costs, in Chapter 11 than in a private workout. Thus, conflict of interest
between equityholders and creditors is more likely to exist for distressed firms with solvency
ratio that is less than the median level. Equityholders in a firm with solvency ratio greater than
the median level (relatively low levels of V) are less likely to choose Chapter 11 since the
bankruptcy costs incurred by equityholders are greater than the benefits of Chapter 11.
First, we estimate the models in Table 4 using two sub-samples separately: sub-sample
with low solvency ratio (72 firms) and sub-sample with high solvency ratio (74 firms).
Table 5 has the logistic regression specifications for all firms in Model (1), Model (2) with
low solvency ratio, and Model (3) for firms with high solvency ratio.
Results in Model (1) of Table 5 show that the coefficient for managerial incentives
(MGT) is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. However, when we analyze
separately with low solvency ratio firms and high solvency ratio firms, the coefficients for
MGT is only significant for firms with low solvency ratio. Results in Model (2) of Table 5
support the hypothesis that managerial incentives are significantly related to the choice of
resolution method. When there is conflict between equityholders and creditors, managers
are more likely to choose Chapter 11 with the increase of their ownership. The coefficient
for managerial ownership (MGT) is positive and highly significant at the 1% level in
Model (2) of Table 5.
In Model (1) the coefficient for the management change (MGT_CH) is negative and
significant at the 10% level. However, the results in Model (2) and (3) show that management change is only related to the choice of resolution method for firms with high
solvency ratio (i.e., firms with no conflict between equityholders and creditors). The
coefficient for MGT_CH is negative and significant at the 5% of level only in Model (3).
The result suggests that when there is no conflict between equityholders and creditors, the
new management is more likely to choose private workout over Chapter 11 filings. Model
(3) in Table 5 shows that when distressed firms have a high solvency ratio, managerial
ownership is not significantly related to the incidence of Chapter 11.
The economic significance of the coefficients for MGT in Model (2) and (3) in Table 5
is also assessed. The increase of managerial ownership by 1% in a range of low solvency
ratio results in the increase of Chapter 11 probability approximately by 0.78% in Model
(2), but the increase of managerial ownership by 1% in a range of high solvency ratio leads
to the decrease of the probability of Chapter 11 by 0.12% in Model (3). These results are
fairly consistent with the model’s prediction. Managerial ownership seems to affect the
decision on the choice between Chapter 11 and a private workout in the presence of
conflict between equityholders and creditors.23
22
Since the sample size in our study is quite small (146 firms), results from the logistic regression are more
likely to be vulnerable to the effect of outliers. However, based on the statistics for RStudent, DFFITS, and
DEBETAS, overall, there are no observations which exhibit an extraordinary behavior.
23
We also estimate the logistic regressions using CEO ownership. Results show that there are no qualitative
changes in the coefficients of the explanatory variables.
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Table 5 Logistic regression for the determinants of the choice between Chapter 11 filing and private
workout
Variables

Coefficient (p-values) dependent variable:
probability of chapter = 1
Model 1
All firms

Intercept
MGT
MGT_CH
BLOCK
Bank debt/total liabilities (BANK)

Model 2 (N = 72)
Firms with low
solvency ratio

0.838

0.687

(0.62)

(0.76)

3.524*

10.911***

Model 3 (N = 74)
Firms with high
solvency ratio
-1.529
(0.64)
-0.500

(0.07)

(0.01)

-0.843*

-0.478

(0.07)

(0.41)

0.890

1.517

2.136

(0.36)

(0.30)

(0.18)

2.219*

1.533

(0.87)
-3.076**
(0.02)

9.058**

(0.06)

(0.31)

(0.04)

Number of long-term debt
contracts (#LTD)

-0.097

-0.149

-0.133

(0.18)

(0.23)

(0.26)

Existence of public debt
(PUBLIC_DEBT)

-0.158

0.08

-0.898

(0.69)

(0.90)

Industry adjusted EBITDA/total assets
(EBITDA_RATIO)

-0.736

0.406

(0.14)

(0.62)

0.140

0.073

0.661

(0.33)

(0.64)

(0.54)

-0.085

-0.065

0.043

(0.54)

(0.75)

(0.85)

0.102

0.180

0.251

Market to book ratio (MB)
Log of total assets (lTA)
Model R2

(0.17)
-4.685**
(0.03)

Note: This table presents the regression coefficients of a logistic regression analysis of the determinants of
firms’ choice between Chapter 11 and private workout during the period 1992–1998. The sample is comprised of firms which attempt the first time to restructure via a Chapter 11 filings (81 firms) or private
workouts (65 firms). A private workout involves private negotiations between a firm and debt-holders. ***,
**, and * denote significant differences at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively

We also examine the impact of other variables (the extent of creditors’ coordination, the
bankruptcy costs, the magnitude of a firm’s economic distress, and the firm’s size) on the
choice between Chapter 11 and a private workout. In Model (1) of Table 5, the coefficients
on BANK are positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. However, the significant and positive impact of BANK is shown only for firms with high solvency ratio in
Model (3) of Table 5. Firms with higher levels of bank debt ratio are more likely to choose
Chapter 11 than a private workout when there is no conflict of interest between equityholders and creditors.
The result suggests that when there is a conflict between equityholders and creditors,
banks are not likely to affect significantly the choice between Chapter 11 and a private
workout because the management has strong incentives in filing for Chapter 11, which may
be aligned with the benefits of equityholders. However, when there is no conflict between
equityholders and creditors, banks prefer Chapter 11 filing to a private workout because
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banks typically hold senior and collateralized debt and they are less willing to make
concessions in a private workout. The coefficients on #LTD and PUBLIC_DEBT in Model
(1), Model (2), and Model (3) of Table 4 are not significantly different from zero.
We also examine the impact of a firm’s degree of economic distress on the choice of the
firm’s resolution method by using the industry-adjusted EBITDA to total asset ratio
(EBITDA_RATIO). Model (3) of Table 5 shows that the coefficient on EBITDA_RATIO
is negative and significant at the 5% level for firms with high solvency ratio. Firms are
more likely to choose Chapter 11 than a private workout, especially when they are more
distressed both financially and economically since high solvency ratio reflects that firms
are more impaired financially.
The market to book value ratio is used to proxy for the bankruptcy costs, but results in
Table 5 indicate that the coefficient on the market to book ratio (MB) is not statistically
significant. The coefficients on the log value of a firm’s total assets (lTA) are not statistically significant either.
To check the robustness of the findings in Table 5, we try different empirical specifications. In Table 6, we interact major explanatory variables with an indicator variable
reflecting that the firm has a value of solvency ratio (SOLV) below the median (LSOLV).
LSOLV indicates the existence of conflict between equityholders and creditors.
Consistent with the results in Table 5, Model (1) and Model (2) in Table 6 show that the
coefficients for managerial ownership (MGT) are positive and highly significant at the 5%
level when MGT interacts with the indicator variable for firms with low solvency ratio
(LSOLV). The significance of the interaction term suggests the significant role of managerial incentives in choosing Chapter 11 filing under the situation of conflict between
equityholders and creditors when managerial ownership is held constant.
The coefficients for MGT_CH with no interaction variable are all negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level in Models (1) and (2) of Table 6. The results suggest that management replacement affects the choice between Chapter 11 and a private workout for firms
with high solvency ratio (i.e., no conflict of interest between equityholders and creditors).
New management is more likely to choose private workout as a debt-restructuring method.
The coefficient for MGT_CH with low solvency ratio is positive and marginally significant at the 10% level only in Model (2) of Table 6. The result may suggest that new
management does not consistently choose Chapter 11 filing when there is conflict between
equityholders and creditors. The results for MGT and MGT_CH in Table 6 are fairly consistent with the results in Table 5. The results for BLOCK are not statistically significant.
Also, consistent with the results in Table 5, the results in Models (1) and (2) of Table 6
show significant results only for BANK_DEBT and Industry Adjusted EBITDA Ratio. The
coefficients for BANK_DEBT with no interaction variable are all positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level in Models (1) and (2) of Table 6. Firms are more likely to
choose Chapter 11 over a private workout with the increase of bank debt ratio (BANK)
when there is no conflict between equityholders and creditors.
However, the coefficients for BANK interacted with LSOLV are all negative and
marginally significant at the 10% level in Models (1) and (2) of Table 6. An increase of
bank debt is marginally related to the choice of private workout when there is a conflict of
interest between equityholders and creditors because managers may have strong incentives
to choose Chapter 11 filing for the benefits of equityholders.
The coefficients on EBITDA_RATIO with no interaction variable in Models (1) and (2)
of Table 6 are negative and significantly different from zero at 5% level. This result is
fairly consistent with the results in Table 5, which also show that firms are more likely to
file for Chapter 11 when they are more distressed both financially and economically.
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Table 6 Logistic regression for the determinants of the choice between Chapter 11 filing and private
workout
Variables

Intercept

Coefficients (p-values) dependent variable:
probability of chapter = 1
Model 1

Model 2

-0.298

-0.057

(0.87)

(0.97)

MGT

-1.138

-0.431

(0.72)

(0.89)

MGT with low solvency ratio

11.736**

11.655**

MGT_CH

-2.624**

(0.03)
(0.05)
MGT_CH with low solvency ratio

2.184
(0.13)

BLOCK

(0.04)
-3.056**
(0.02)
2.596*
(0.08)
2.092
(0.19)

BLOCK with low solvency ratio

-0.676
(0.75)

BANK_DEBT
BANK_DEBT with low solvency ratio

8.503**

8.877**

(0.04)

(0.03)

-7.250*

-7.322*

(0.10)

(0.10)

#LTD

-0.132

-0.146

(0.24)

(0.21)

#LTD with low solvency ratio

-0.101

-0.001

(0.94)

(0.96)

PUBLIC_DEBT

-0.588

-0.827

(0.32)

(0.19)

PUBLIC_DEBT with low solvency ratio
Industry adjusted EBITDA_RATIO

0.605

0.876

(0.50)

(0.35)

-4.722**
(0.03)

Industry adjusted EBITDA_RATIO with low solvency ratio

4.780**
(0.03)

Market to book ratio (MB)
Market to book ratio (MB) with low solvency ratio
Log of total assets (lTA)
Log of total assets (lTA) with low solvency ratio
Model R2

-4.532**
(0.04)
4.868**
(0.03)

0.489

0.481

(0.65)

(0.64)

-0.384

-0.399

(0.73)

(0.70)

-0.018

-0.056

(0.91)

(0.73)

0.051

0.053

(0.68)

(0.67)

0.206

0.222

Note: This table presents the regression coefficients of a logistic regression analysis of the determinants of
firms’ choice between Chapter 11 and private workout during the period 1992–1998. The sample is comprised of firms which attempt the first time to restructure via a Chapter 11 filings (81 firms) or private
workouts (65 firms). A private workout involves private negotiations between a firm and debt-holders. ***,
**, and * denote significant differences at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
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However, the coefficients on EBITDA_RATIO interacted with LSOLV in Models (1) and
(2) of Table 6 are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result suggests
that when there is conflict between equityholders and creditors, economically viable firms
are more likely file for Chapter 11 to avoid creditors’ holdout problems. Other control
variables are not statistically significant in Models (1) and (2) of Table 6, but there are no
significant qualitative changes in regression results compared with the results in Table 5.
To summarize, the evidence indicates that the choice between Chapter 11 and a private
workout is related to the ownership structure of financially distressed firms with relatively low
solvency ratios as well as management replacement before the onset of restructuring for firms
with high solvency ratio. Assuming that low solvency ratios indicate that there is conflict of
interest between equityholders and creditors, the findings are consistent with our model’s
prediction. With the increase of managerial ownership, firms are more likely to file for Chapter
11, which indicates the existence of managerial incentives for the decision of restructuring
method even after controlling for management displacements. Furthermore, the results of the
logistic regression provide confirming evidence that distressed firms’ choice of debt restructuring methods depends on a firm’s debt structure and its level of economic distress.

7 Conclusion
This study investigates whether managerial incentives are related to the incidence of
Chapter 11 filing in the presence of conflict of interests between equityholders and creditors when a firm is in financial distress. By using a simple framework, we show that given
the managerial payoff structure in a financially distressed firm, conflict between managers
and equityholders can arise over the choice between Chapter 11 and a private workout;
managerial incentives can be a determinant of the firm’s choice of resolution method.
The empirical evidence supports these predictions. We show that managerial ownership is
related to the choice between Chapter 11 and a private workout for a sample of 81 voluntary
Chapter 11 filing and 65 private workout firms. More specifically, when the low solvency ratio
is used as a proxy for conflict of interest between equityholders and creditors, we find that the
likelihood of Chapter 11 filing is significantly related to managerial ownership of a distressed
firm when the firm’s solvency ratio is relatively low. When the distressed firm’s solvency ratio is
relatively high, the incidence of Chapter 11 is not related to the managerial ownership, but the
result shows that new management is more likely to choose a private workout.
Although our study clearly shows that managerial incentives can play a role in determining
the methods for resolving a firm’s financial distress, it has several limitations which may be
improved in the future research. First, we consider only the firm’s voluntary Chapter 11 filing
and private renegotiation in the analysis. However, there are other methods the distressed
firms frequently use to resolve their financial distress (such as public exchanges and prepackaged Chapter 11 filing), which may also be included in the analysis. Second, in our study,
we primarily use managerial ownership of distressed firms as a major proxy for managerial
incentives. However, other variables may also be used as a proxy for managerial incentives
(e.g., compensation structure of managers and board structure).
Finally, the practical implication of our findings is that under the situations where
equityholders prefer to choose Chapter 11 but creditors’ preference is private renegotiation, more effective monitoring and better alignment of managers’ interests with those of
shareholders will reduce the agency conflict between managers and equityholders and
increase the likelihood of Chapter 11 filing.
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Appendix
Parameter values in Fig. 1a and b can be derived based on the payoff structure for creditors
and equityholders in both a private workout and Chapter 11 resolution. Assuming that
CB [ CW and d(B) [ d(W),
VD (W) ¼ min[D, (1  d(W))(V  CW ), and VD (B) ¼ min[D, (1  d(B))(V  CB )],
VE (W) ¼ (V  CW )  VD (W), and VE (B) ¼ (V  CB )  VD (B).
In Fig. 1a, V2 denotes the firm’s value at reorganization (V) in which creditors are paid
in full in a private workout, such that D = (1 - d(W))(V - CW). Thus, V = D/(1 d(W)) + CW. V4 represents V in which creditors are paid in full in Chapter 11, such that
D = (1 - d(B))(V - CB). Thus, V = D/(1 - d(B) + CB. In Fig. 1b, when V [ V4,
creditors are paid in full both in a private workout and in Chapter 11. Thus the residual
values that equityholders can retain are (V - CB) - D in Chapter 11 and (V - CW) - D
in a private workout.
When V \ V4, equityholders’ payoff structure in Chapter 11 has changed to the point
where V is close to V3 because in this range, creditors are not fully paid only in Chapter 11.
Thus, when V3 \ V \ V4, the payoff to equityholders is (V - CB) - (1 - d(B))(V CB) (i.e., d(B))(V - CB)) in Chapter 11 and (V - CW) - D in a private workout. V3 is the
point where d(B))(V - CB) = (V - CW) - D. Thus, V3 denotes V such that
D þ CW  dðBÞCB
1  dðBÞ

V¼

When V \ V2, equityholders’ payoff structure in a private workout has changed
because in this range, creditors are not fully paid both in Chapter 11 and in a private
workout. Thus, the payoff to equityholders is (V - CB) - (1 - d(B))(V - CB)
(i.e., d(B)(V - CB)) in Chapter 11 and (V - CW) - (1 - d(W))(V - CW) (i.e., d(W))
(V - CW)) in a private workout. Equityholders still can retain higher value in Chapter 11
than in a private workout until V reaches V1. V1 is the point where d(B))(V - CB) =
d(W))(V - CW). Thus, V1 denotes V such that
V¼

dðBÞCB  dðWÞCW
dðBÞ  dðWÞ

In summary, the parameter values (V1, V2, V3, and V4) in Fig. 1a and b are denoted as
follows.
V1 ¼

dðBÞCB  dðWÞCW
dðBÞ  dðWÞ

V3 ¼

D þ CW  dðBÞCB
1  dðBÞ

V2 = D/(1 - d(W)) + CW

V4 = D/(1 - d(B)) + CB.

123

lTA

Other control variable: firm size

SOLV

Log value of a firm’s total assets

Solvency ratio equals the ratio of book value of debt to total debt plus the market value of
equity

Industry adjusted earnings before interest, depreciation, amortization and taxes as a
proportion of total assets

Industry-adjusted EBITDA_RATIO

The existence of conflict between equity and debt: solvency ratio

PUBLIC_DEBT = 1 if a firm has public debts
Bank debt, measured by the ratio of a bank to the firm’s liabilities

BANK

The number of long-term debt contracts

PUBLIC_DEBT

#LTD

Creditors’ holdout problems and the level of economic distress

MB

The potential loss of a firm’s going concern value in Chapter 11 which is measured by the
ratio of the firm’s market to book value of assets

The percentage of shares of outside blockholders with at least a five percent stake in the firm,
which is not related to the management

BLOCK

Deadweight costs in Chapter 11

The percentage of shares of a firm’s officers and directors
Top management change prior to debt restructuring

MGT_CH

=1 if a firm files for Chapter 11, and 0 if it renegotiates privately with creditors

Measurements

MGT

Ownership structure

Explanatory variables

DUMMY

Dependent variable

Variables

Table A1 Description of the dependent and explanatory variables and their measurements

The influence of managerial incentives
81

123

123
0.070

The numbers in the parenthesis below the correlation coefficients are estimated probability levels that the true correlation is zero

0.450

(0.00)

0.401

0.063
(0.44)

(0.00)
0.185

(0.00)

(0.96)

(0.47)

-0.061

(0.13)

0.124

(0.14)

-0.123

(0.03)

0.184

(0.14)

-0.123

(0.00)

-0.251

(0.23)

0.101

Log(TA)

(0.03)

0.408

(0.33)

-0.081

(0.07)

0.152

(0.00)

-0.389

(0.74)

0.028

(0.00)

-0.434

(0.48)

-0.059

(0.09)

0.140

SOLV

0.004

0.085
(0.31)

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.12)

(0.74)

0.155

(0.17)

-0.153

0.128

0.027

(0.52)

-0.114

-0.054

(0.70)

(0.59)

-0.046

(0.00)

-0.238

(0.95)

0.005

(0.40)

0.071

#LTD

(0.11)

-0.031

(0.29)

0.134

(0.08)

-0.146

(0.00)

-0.241

(0.24)

0.099

PUBLIC_DEBT

0.049

(0.55)

(0.27)

-0.089

(0.16)

0.118

(0.59)

0.044

(0.3)

-0.128

BANK

(0.55)

-0.049

(0.21)

-0.104

(0.94)

0.006

(0.07)

0.152

EBITDA_
RATIO

0.091

(0.01)

(0.26)

(0.40)
0.232

(0.01)

(0.46)

-0.061

MB

0.094

-0.229

(0.80)

-0.021

0.128

(0.07)

BLOCK

(0.13)

0.050

(0.54)

-0.146

MGTCH

Note: There are 146 observations in the sample

Solvency ratio (SOLV)

Number of long-term debt
(#LTD)

The existence of public debt
(PUBLIC_DEBT)

Bank debt/assets (BANK)

EBITDA/Liabilities
(EBITDA_RATIO)

Market to book ratio (MB)

Outside blockholders’
ownership (BLOCK)

Management change
(MGTCH)

Managerial ownership
(MGT)

Dummy = 1 (Chapter 11)

MGT

Table A2 Correlation coefficients
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